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Abstract 
Over coming decades, deep reductions in carbon emissions will be required from existing social 
housing as part of the UK’s effort to combat climate change. The ability of social landlords to 
carry out interventions to achieve these emission cuts is strongly influenced by the context in 
which they operate. This paper reports the results of a 3-year participant observation study of one 
UK social landlord, undertaken with the aim of identifying contextual factors that either support or 
hinder its ability to carry out carbon reduction interventions. The results indicate that a lack of 
funds to finance the required interventions is the most significant barrier to the achievement of 
deep emission cuts. Other key issues identified include the lack of a strong drive to act from 
Government, a need for increased internal capacity to enable landlords to deliver and manage 
carbon reduction interventions, and a low level of interest from residents in achieving emission 
cuts. These results lead to a number of recommendations for policymakers: to mandate action on 
the part of social landlords to achieve high levels of energy efficiency in their stock; to intervene in 
the market to make the required interventions financially viable; to put forward policies and long-
term goals that will enable social landlords and householders to view stock refurbishment as part 
of a society-wide effort to decarbonise existing housing. 
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The global effort to combat climate change is likely to require strong action to achieve 
cuts in carbon emissions from the existing housing stock of industrialised countries such 
as the UK. The UK Government has set a legally-binding target of achieving at least an 
80% cut in the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels 
(DECC 2009), and expects the housing sector to contribute cuts of at least that 
magnitude. Social housing makes up around a fifth of UK homes, and differs markedly 
from other housing sectors in that it is regulated and heavily influenced by Government 
policy. As a result, social housing providers are likely to be at the forefront of any efforts 
to comprehensively refurbish existing UK housing to achieve substantial carbon emission 
cuts.  
 
Whilst a number of assessments of the technical measures required to achieve deep 
emission cuts in UK housing over the coming decades have been conducted (for example, 
Boardman 2007; WWF 2008), little research has explored the viability of achieving such 
cuts for particular housing sectors (e.g. private rented housing, social housing). This 
paper describes results from an EPSRC-funded research project that explores this issue 
for the social housing sector, through a case study of one UK social landlord (reported in 
full in XXXX (2009a)). The case study focuses on Peabody (formerly the Peabody Trust), 
a housing association that manages 18,000 homes in London. Much of Peabody’s stock 
consists of solid-walled Victorian-era blocks of flats, and nearly half of its stock is in 
conservation areas, making low-carbon refurbishment both technically and politically 
challenging. 
 
Prior research has identified that emission cuts of up to 80% can be achieved in UK 
housing by 2050 through the widespread application of technical interventions, such as 
solid wall insulation, efficient appliances and micro-generation technologies (Boardman 
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2007; WWF 2008). A study of the impacts of technical measures on emissions from 
Peabody stock in the period up to 2030 produced similar results (XXXX et al. 
forthcoming). A key finding was that for Peabody stock to achieve the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) target of a 60% cut in emissions by 2025 (GLA 2007), considerable 
investment in carbon reduction technologies is likely to be necessary. The required 
measures include: extensive solid wall insulation and double glazing to improve the 
thermal efficiency of Peabody’s older estates; converting estates to low-carbon sources of 
communal heating; ( if stronger action is required) installations of solar photovoltaics and 
solar thermal systems (XXXX et al. forthcoming).  
 
Whilst the technical feasibility of achieving deep emission cuts in UK housing over future 
decades does not appear to be in doubt, the slow progress to date in carrying out carbon 
reduction refurbishment (Killip 2008) implies that a number of barriers to action exist. 
Some of the issues identified in literature to date, both for UK housing in general and 
social housing in particular, include: 
 
§ A lack of capacity in UK industry to design and deliver whole-house 
refurbishments, which incorporate technologies such as solid wall insulation and 
district heating (Foresight 2008; Killip 2008).  
§ Concerns to retain the architectural character of heritage dwellings, leading to a 
trade-off with the goal of achieving carbon emission cuts (Changeworks 2008). 
§ Social landlords lacking the resources required to fund low carbon refurbishment 
of their stock (Cooper and Jones 2008). This situation is compounded by the 
problem of “split incentives”, whereby landlords are unable to recoup the costs of 
investments in energy saving technologies, as the benefits (in terms of lower fuel 
bills) accrue to tenants (Housing Corporation 2008; EHA 2009). Rent increases 
are typically not a viable option for addressing this issue in the UK, due to 



































































increase rent levels. This situation that has been identified as a key barrier to the 
funding of interventions to reduce carbon emissions (UKGBC 2008; EHA 2009). 
 
The existence of such issues provides the motivation for the present study, which sought 
to identify and document any contextual factors, both internal and external to Peabody, 
which affect its ability to carry out actions to achieve carbon emission cuts. Through 
identifying these issues for the particular case of Peabody, the study aims to improve the 
understanding of the conditions required to enable social landlords to act to achieve deep 
carbon emission cuts from the homes they manage. 
 
Methodology 
The research methodology was developed using a framework for research design put 
forward by Maxwell (2005), which links the motivations and aims introduced above with 
the conceptual background which informs the study, the methods used, and steps taken to 
ensure the validity of findings. 
Conceptual background 
This research draws upon concepts from four principal fields of enquiry: organisational 
behaviour, organisational change, innovation, and literature on sustainability in 
organisations. The key concepts used to inform the study’s design and data analysis are 
introduced below. 
 
The study is founded upon the standard assumption within organisational behaviour 
literature that the actions of an organisation are greatly influenced by the context (often 
termed environment) in which it operates (Capon 2000). A useful distinction is often 
made between external and internal context (ibid). External issues include the broad 



































































innovation) and relationships with stakeholders.  For a social landlord such as Peabody, 
key stakeholders include regulators, Government, residents and local authorities. An 
organisation’s internal context refers to a number of inter-related issues such as its 
structure, culture, resources, processes, history and strategy (Pettigrew et al. 1992; Capon 
2000). Whilst the internal-external distinction is of some use, many issues can also be 
considered in a way that cuts across the internal-external boundary, an approach taken 
where data were analysed thematically (e.g. “Financial issues”) in the present study. For 
example, even a relatively unambiguously external issue, such as an economic downturn, 
must be “enacted” internally by staff choosing to give the issue attention and changing 
their behaviour in response (Hendry 1996).  
 
A shift towards carrying out extensive carbon reduction refurbishment could entail a 
potentially significant organisational change for a social landlord, due to the scale of 
action required, and the new ways of working involved when carrying out measures that 
result in energy being supplied directly to residents. Contextual issues play a key role in 
explaining change in organisations, with both external and internal context and the 
changes in context over time each being crucial issues to consider (Pettigrew 1992). 
Literature on organisational change is consistent in terms of classifying contextual issues 
as either enabling or constraining the issue of change under consideration (Balogun 
1998). The terms “drivers” and “barriers” are commonly-used labels to describe these 
factors and are used in the present study. 
 
The take-up of carbon reduction technologies amongst social landlords can be usefully 
viewed as a process of diffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003). From this field comes the 
insight that the take-up of successful technologies tends to follow an “s-curve” over time, 
with a slow initial take-up, led by early adopters, followed by rapid adoption and then 
slow take-up by later adopters (ibid). The existence of this pattern implies that the 



































































to relate to the stage of take-up of a technology, making time an important factor in data 
analysis. Another framework for analysing innovation, put forward by Rouse (2003), 
suggests that the prospects for an innovation being taken up can be judged in terms of its 
viability, acceptability and validity. Applied to this study, these concepts usefully focus 
attention on whether actions are viable for Peabody (i.e. affordable and not requiring 
unacceptable trade-offs with other goals) and acceptable (for Peabody staff, residents and 
other stakeholders). The question of validity (for this study, relating to whether 
interventions lead to emission cuts) is explored in XXXX et al. (forthcoming). 
 
Research on action to improve the environmental sustainability of organisations has 
identified both external and internal contextual issues as motivating factors for change 
(Prakash 2001; Bansal 2003). Legislation is a key external driver in many cases, with 
many organisations categorised as being “compliance-driven”, in the sense that they do 
just enough to meet the demands of legislators. Other organisations can be said to act 
“above compliance”, with stakeholder influences being identified as principal causes of 
this behaviour (see e.g. Prakash 2001). In an extensive investigation into why 
corporations “go green”, Bansal and Roth (2000) outlined three independent motivations, 
which were used to analyse Peabody’s actions in the present study: Legitimation 
(consisting of legislation, stakeholder influences and norms for the sector), 
Competitiveness, and Ecological Responsibility. The concept of motivations can be 
understood as being equivalent to “drivers” for action, and will include factors affecting 
an organisation that may be external or internal in origin. 
 
Within literature on energy efficiency aimed at UK social landlords, a number of internal 
contextual factors which support action to reduce carbon emissions have been suggested. 
These include strategic changes (developing strategies for energy/carbon reduction/etc.), 
structural changes (creating a dedicated post for work on energy management) and 



































































Housing Corporation 2008). The term “facilitating action” is used in this study to 
describe any organisational intervention that, whilst not leading to potential reductions in 
stock carbon emissions in itself, is likely to facilitate action within the organisation to 
achieve this goal (e.g. developing a sustainability strategy).  
 
Methods 
To achieve the study’s aims, the over-arching method used was participant observation, 
through which a researcher simultaneously observes and participates in the social 
situation being studied. Data collection at Peabody was guided by the framework put 
forward by Pettigrew et al. (1992) for participant observation studies and sought to 
identify:  
o actions being undertaken or considered  
o the process behind action on carbon reduction (how and when actions were 
undertaken)  
o contextual factors affecting actions 
 
The actions studied consisted of 3 types: technical interventions (those carried out during 
the research period, and the interventions recommended for Peabody stock based upon 
the technical analysis undertaken in parallel); behavioural interventions; facilitating 
actions. 
 
Data were collected from June 2006 until April 2009 through a variety of methods: 
formal interviews, attendance at meetings, attendance at resident events, informal 
opportunistic conversations with staff and analysis of relevant documents. Interviews 
were semi-structured so as to address specific issues identified as important, whilst 



































































data collection were identified and taken up responsively according to developments at 
Peabody.  
 
During the research period, the author made 36 visits to Peabody, and on days of visits 
was based in its Asset Management department. Research issues were discussed in 52 
semi-structured interviews and informal discussions, involving 25 Peabody staff in all. In 
addition, the author was invited to participate in 15 internal meetings relevant to this 
research, 2 events for Peabody residents and at 5 meetings with external organisations. 
The author also had extensive day to day contact over email and telephone with Peabody 
staff and was granted full access to relevant internal documents by Peabody.  
 
At the start of the research period, the action being undertaken by Peabody to achieve 
carbon emission reductions was identified through meetings and interviews with relevant 
staff. Ongoing action beyond that time was then monitored through regular meetings with 
six Peabody staff whose responsibilities related to stock energy use, who can be described 
as “key informants” for this study. Whenever action was undertaken, staff were 
interviewed on how it came to happen, on any contextual issues affecting that action and 
on its practical outcomes. 
 
As the technical analysis of Peabody stock was developed, interim research findings were 
presented to Peabody staff and residents on a number of occasions from late 2007 to early 
2009, and views on the viability and acceptability of the considered refurbishment 
measures were collected. At the end of the research period, four of the six key informants 
introduced above were still working at Peabody. Three of these four staff members (those 
having the most detailed knowledge on relevant issues for this research) were interviewed 
together in February 2009 to identify contextual issues affecting the recommended 




































































All meetings and conversations with Peabody staff were documented through case notes 
taken during the interaction, and written up as soon as possible afterwards. Meetings were 
recorded and later transcribed where possible, but in most cases this could not be 
achieved, either because of permission not being granted or the discussion taking place in 
an informal context.  
 
The data generated for analysis by the methods described above comprised 4 interview 
transcripts, notes from 68 meetings and discussions, 11 internal documents, 27 relevant 
emails and 2 external documents produced by Peabody. These data were analysed by 
coding into relevant themes, using both a priori codes (based upon the theoretical 
background discussed above), and codes emerging from the data.  Analysis was 
conducted using King’s Template Analysis framework (King 2009). 
Validity 
Two of the key threats to validity for this study relate to: the accuracy of the account of 
actions undertaken and issues reported by Peabody staff; conclusions on the relative 
importance of issues identified.  A number of the strategies put forward by Maxwell 
(2005) to mitigate specific validity threats were employed to address these issues, 
including intensive long-term involvement in the research setting (allowing ideas to be 
developed and tested over time), triangulation (involving the use of multiple data sources 
and respondents) and respondent validation (soliciting feedback on data and conclusions). 
The latter step involved the account presented in this paper being checked by two 
members of Peabody staff for accuracy prior to publication. 
 
Maxwell (2005) also identifies reactivity (the influence of the researcher on the research 
environment) as a potential threat to validity, affecting the ability to generalise from the 
Peabody experience. For this study, researcher influence on Peabody was a necessary and 



































































order to secure and maintain the support of the case-study organisation. This influence 
creates a need for an honest account of its impact on the behaviour of the case-study 
organisation, so these influences were recorded throughout the study and are reported 
here.  
 
The scope of the research, being a case study of a single organisation, potentially limits 
the validity of generalising findings more widely (Yin 2003). Case study research can 
however provide “generalisations to theory”, meaning theoretical explanations of the data 
observed which may also be applicable in similar cases where similar conditions prevail 
(ibid). Such generalisations are likely to be possible for the wider UK social housing 
sector from this study, due to the similar conditions under which social landlords operate, 
and the broadly similar demographic profile of UK social housing tenants. Although a 
single case study design is typically viewed as inferior to using multiple cases from the 
perspective of identifying findings that can be generalised, it can be of great value where 
the case in question is “unique”, “typical”, or “revelatory” due to the researcher having 
access to a previously inaccessible situation (ibid). The latter rationale is of particular 
relevance for this research, where rare and extensive access was granted to the staff, 
documents and internal processes of a social landlord over a three-year period.  
 
A further benefit of studying Peabody comes from its status as an early adopter of action 
to reduce carbon emissions from its existing stock (evidenced by the findings from the 
present study). Early adopter social landlords are more likely to encounter institutional 
barriers which may need to be removed to make interventions viable (Egmond et al. 
2006). This creates a motivation to study the barriers they encounter, in order to identify 




































































The results presented here start with a summary of Peabody’s broad context, its recent 
history and the actions it took during the research period, in order to contextualise the 
discussion on other issues identified that follows. Contextual factors affecting action to 
reduce stock carbon emissions are then described, starting with drivers (“Motivation”) 
followed by a number of issues that potentially act as barriers to action. Peabody staff are 
quoted throughout to provide support for the account put forward. Where this is done the 
date of the statement is given in italics (for example “March 2008”), but the name or role 
of staff is not given to ensure anonymity. 
 
The structure used here to report the results is based upon the principal codes that arose 
out of data analysis, and is shown in Table 1 (see XXXX (2009a) for a complete listing of 
the codes and sub-codes identified). It was found that a thematic data analysis (using 
themes such as “residents”) provided a better fit with the data than employing a strict 
external/internal context split, so the reporting of results here reflects that approach.  
 
Table 1 Structure of Results section 












Behavioural interventions  
Motivation 
Legitimation 















































































Resources, internal processes and staff views 
Skills, internal capacity and partnerships 
Internal processes and prioritisation of goals 
Staff attitudes to interventions 
Internal resources 
Strategy and management 
Staff attitudes, views and framing 
a
 a priori codes are shown in bold 
Broad context and recent history 
For several years prior to the research period, Peabody played an active and innovative 
role in efforts to mitigate climate change in housing, both through action and research. 
The most high-profile action was developing the BedZED estate in 2003, a pioneering 
attempt to construct zero-carbon new housing (Bioregional 2004). A poor outcome in an 
Audit Commission inspection in 2003 and the new requirement for Peabody stock to meet 
the Decent Homes Standard by 2010 brought about a significant shift in Peabody’s 
organisational focus. The Decent Homes Standard sets minimum standards for the state of 
repair, services, facilities and thermal comfort of existing housing in England, and must 
be met by housing associations by 2010. Meeting the Decent Homes Standard represented 
a considerable financial challenge, and to fund the work required, Peabody reluctantly 
decided to sell targeted stock as part of a “disposals” programme which will be ongoing 
to 2010 (Peabody Trust Asset Management Strategy 2006). Reorganisation led to a 
significant number of redundancies and many of the staff that had driven Peabody’s green 
agenda in previous years left the organisation.  
 
When the present research commenced in mid-2006, good performance in an ongoing 
Audit Commission inspection was an over-riding strategic focus for the organisation. 
Following a successful outcome, in autumn 2006 there was a new focus within Peabody 
on “blue skies” thinking (February 2007), and the Chief Executive initiated new strategic 
work on sustainability. A key influence supporting this process was a talk given in 
October 2006 at Peabody by Allan Jones, Chief Executive of the London Climate Change 





































































Over the research period, there was a transformation in the internal focus on climate 
change and sustainability issues within Peabody, illustrated by the quotes below. 
“No-one is discussing energy strategy in the Trust, and no one is responsible.” 
August 2006 
“Peabody chief executive Stephen Howlett takes the lead on sustainability 
matters and the SHIFT
1
 feedback said that sustainability was ingrained 
throughout the organisation.” (Inside Housing 2009)  
 
This shift in internal context was strongly influenced by an external shift, with the profile 
of climate change increasing amongst the public and businesses during the research 
period. This influence was apparent amongst Peabody staff who explained their action on 
climate change as being “because it's in the news every week” (January 2007), or as “just 
the way things are going… a general zeitgeist” (February 2009).  
Actions undertaken 
Facilitating actions 
The new strategic focus on environmental issues at Peabody led to the creation of a 
“Green Task Force” championed by the Chief Executive in early 2007 focussing largely 
on environmental issues within Peabody’s business operations. From early 2009 it was 
replaced by a “Sustainability Working Group” comprising of departmental heads and 
chaired by the Chief Executive, with the aim of providing a forum with greater power and 
accountability within the organisation to drive action to meet targets in Peabody’s 
sustainability strategy. Following the presentation by Allan Jones in October 2006, a 
                                                     
1
 SHIFT (Sustainable Homes Index For Tomorrow) is a framework for monitoring work 



































































decision was taken to create a full-time Energy Efficiency Coordinator position within the 
Asset Management department, with the post being filled from January 2008. 
 
In early 2007 the 21
st
 Century Peabody project was initiated by the Chief Executive, with 
the aims of creating “a vision for the organisation for the next 25 years”, and to 
“reinvigorate Peabody’s reputation as a leading agency on social policy issues” (from 21
st
 
Century Project brief, Peabody Trust 2007). Aspects of the 21
st
 Century Peabody project 
that addressed carbon reduction were studied by the author, leading to the report XXXX 
(2009b) and a feature in the Guardian newspaper in March 2009 (Howlett 2009). The 21
st
 
Century Peabody project is one example of the increased efforts taken by Peabody during 
the research period to influence Government policy. Other actions taken include 
responding to two UK Government consultations (on the Renewable Energy Strategy and 
the Heat and Energy Saving Strategy) as part of the G15 group of London social 
landlords, and participating in the Social Housing group of the Energy Efficiency 
Partnership for Homes (a stakeholder forum for organisations with an interest in 
improving domestic energy efficiency). Peabody has also sought to influence its 
residents, by choosing climate change as the major theme of its 2007 residents’ 
conference.  
 
In 2009, Peabody was one of a small number of social landlords to be assessed using 
Sustainable Homes’ SHIFT framework (Sustainable Homes 2009), and were positioned 
in the top category of participating landlords, achieving a silver rating (Inside Housing 
2009). Within the G15 group, Peabody was one of the few organisations (in February 
2009) to have a dedicated member of staff working on sustainability issues.  
 
Finally, the research project reported in this paper was also an important facilitating 
action in itself. It led to a number of well-attended presentations being given to Peabody 



































































the author. This engagement was reported by Peabody staff as playing a significant role in 
shaping internal discussion on climate change and reinstating the importance of 
sustainability (April 2009).  
 
Technical interventions 
The vast majority of carbon reduction interventions undertaken by Peabody during the 
research period were being carried out through works to meet the Decent Homes 
standard. These comprised the installation of gas central heating systems, cavity wall 
insulation and loft insulation and a small number of double glazing installations. The 
Decent Homes work was initially designed to meet but not exceed the minimum standard 
required, due to financial constraints (Peabody Trust Asset Management Strategy 2006). 
The level of improvements carried out was upgraded in 2008, with the Energy Efficiency 
Coordinator securing grant funding to ensure that all homes would receive cavity wall 
insulation and loft insulation where possible. 
 
The possible intervention of making low-energy appliances more affordable for tenants 
through bulk procurement was discussed by staff throughout the research period, but a 
delivery mechanism has yet to be established. Energy efficient light bulbs have been 
distributed to residents through tenant welcome packs and estate events throughout the 
research period.  
 
With regard to the more extensive measures considered (solid wall insulation, district 
heating, micro-generation), little action has been undertaken. An opportunity to replace a 
faulty communal heating system with gas-fired combined heat and power (CHP) in 2007 
was not taken up, due primarily to a need to urgently replace the existing system. A small 
new development was connected to an existing district heating network in 2008. Due to 
the use of CHP generation plant to supply this network, it provided a lower-carbon heat 



































































boilers. It was therefore effective as a carbon reduction measure, but required substantial 
staff time to assess questions of management of heat supply, billing and maintenance 
responsibilities. The connection proved to be very expensive and a connection of existing 
dwellings on the same estate to the network was ruled out on grounds of cost. 
 
Behavioural interventions 
In late 2006, the only behavioural intervention being carried out by Peabody was the 
provision of written energy efficiency advice to new tenants as part of tenant welcome 
packs. Tenants receiving new heating systems through Decent Homes works were not 
being given guidance on their efficient use, and property negotiators claimed to lack 
confidence in giving effective face-to-face energy efficiency advice to tenants. By early 
2009, the work of the Energy Efficiency Co-ordinator led to increased action being 
carried out. A number of frontline staff had been trained as energy advisors (Howlett 
2009), and energy monitors providing live feedback on electricity use had been made 
available for free to all residents from late 2008. With regard to the offer of energy 
monitors, 30 out of Peabody’s 18,000 households had taken up the offer by May 2009, in 
response to an advertisement in Peabody’s newspaper for residents. The reasons for this 
initial low take-up rate are not clear, but some possible explanatory factors include: many 
households not seeing the advertisement; the effort required for householders to take the 
initiative of contacting Peabody to request a monitor; a low interest on the part of tenants 
in reducing their energy use (see below).  
Motivation 
The results relating to the motivations identified for carrying out carbon reduction 
interventions are presented here using an adaptation of the framework put forward by 
Bansal and Roth (2000). Once the a priori code “Ecological Responsibility” was 
broadened to “Ecological and Social Responsibility” (so that concerns about fuel poverty 




































































Of the motivations that relate to legitimation, there was considerable evidence that 
Government regulation was a key motivating factor. This was reflected in what can be 
termed a culture of compliance, with action commonly being framed in terms of what was 
required by regulation, and these requirements being key drivers for the organisation.  
“Targets... that's what [the Chief Executive’s] interested in. He's, like, when's 
someone going to come and say ‘you're breaking the law’…” February 2007 
“Where is the regulation that’s going to make us do this?” July 2007 
 “On a really basic level, we have to meet Decent Homes… we have to provide 
thermal comfort... and we don't strictly have to do any more than that.” February 
2009 
This perspective was often coupled with a belief that strong action would be difficult to 
justify unless it was made compulsory. 
“In spite of our best efforts… unless somebody came along and said by 2020 
everything has to be so and so... I think it would be really hard to justify 
dedicated expenditure.” February 2009 
Decent Homes regulation was by far the strongest existing regulatory influence on 
Peabody. The use of SAP
2
 ratings as a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) by social 
housing regulators also created a motivation to show year-on-year energy efficiency 
improvements, which was achieved through Decent Homes measures. With regard to a 
more ambitious carbon reduction agenda, Peabody staff did not perceive a strong drive 
from Government or regulators throughout the research period. 
“We’re surprised they’ve said nothing about this so far” June 2007 
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“Not many people externally are pushing us to do anything about it… it would 
need a drastic sea-change in our KPIs, wouldn't it?” February 2009 
Despite the lack of regulation mandating strong action to reduce stock emissions, there 
was a widespread expectation amongst Peabody staff throughout the research project that 
such regulation would be brought in soon.  
“External pressures... they're not yet biting. They're evident... it's evident that 
they'll come.” February 2007 
“It’s the right thing to do and we’re going to be made to do it anyway” June 2007 
“It's going to be mandated at some point” February 2009 
Research by Peabody, including support for the present research, was justified as 
preparation for when such regulation came in.  
 “Actually what's likely to happen is that at some point somebody's going to make 
big changes for existing buildings, and we've got to be on top of that… and 
unless we start thinking about it now, we'll be off the pace.” February 2007 
The perception that future regulation was around the corner was typically coupled with 
strong concerns around its financial impact on Peabody.  
“It'll be interesting to see what they do for existing buildings, because it could 
cripple some organisations. It's like the building regs, every time you change 
them, you've got to be careful that you don't just drive... just stop the economy 
almost...” February 2007 
“How do these people think we’ll pay for it?” July 2007 




































































This concern was alleviated by a belief that regulations would not be brought in that 
demanded action that was impossible to achieve, or that threatened the financial viability 
of social landlords. 
“But then nobody can stick a piece of legislation out there that actually means 
that 20% of RSLs have to shut as it were.” February 2009 
Ecological and social responsibility 
Climate change was reported as a strong motivator for action by many Peabody staff, 
with the increasing prominence of the issue in the media being cited as the main cause of 
this. Fuel poverty was not a high priority at Peabody towards the start of the research, but 
rose up the agenda as fuel prices increased during 2008. 
“I’m worried about fuel costs for this winter” June 2008 
“I guess another driver is fuel poverty, as in, it's not a statutory driver, but if fuel 
goes up and up and up, the cost of, there'd be a lot of our residents who'd really 
not be able to switch their heating on” February 2009 
These motivations were driven both with reference to the social values and poverty 
reduction agenda of Peabody as an organisation and through staff with environmental 
values driving actions through their own initiative.  
 “The other thing is, it's not an external pressure it's an internal pressure. I think 
there's loads of people in this organisation that are keen to get involved, and that's 
really a motivating factor as well.” February 2007 
“As a social business we recognise the responsibility we have to protect the 
environment for our generation and future generations.” April 2009 
Competitiveness 
A concern for competitiveness was reflected in two goals put forward by Peabody staff 



































































“What we want to do is make sure we've got an effective strategy, which is 
innovative, promotes a more efficient, green business… it can contribute to our 
financial efficiency.” January 2007 
A concern for reputation was framed in terms of Peabody’s recent status as a pioneer, 
exemplified through the BedZED development, and a desire to maintain and enhance that 
reputation. 
“Given the estates that we've got, we've got the biggest opportunity, and if we 
can, we can achieve what is our vision of being a beacon organisation… but I 
think the major reason really was the wish to continue this pioneering spirit at 
Peabody.” February 2007 
 “Peabody in very broad terms, would like… to be seen to be at the forefront, 
certainly within the RSL movement, of making progressive moves towards 
meaningful carbon reduction within its stock.” February 2009 
Financial arguments for action were rarely put forward, given the concerns about 
interventions not being affordable for Peabody (detailed below). When they were put 
forward, it was in terms of the risk that future increases in fuel costs could lead to 
Peabody homes having very high heating costs, making stock potentially unlettable. 
“One way of looking at the financial case for us is, for example, if fuel prices go 
up severely, we might have unlettable stock – that’s a financial case for this kind 
of investment.” July 2007 
“I think it's also seen as a risk and it's being profiled as a higher risk for the 





































































Financial viability was an issue that was often raised by Peabody staff, both in terms of 
the organisation as a whole and for particular interventions. The issue that first and 
foremost Peabody needs to stay viable as a business was stressed on many occasions. 
 “Maybe we will spend two million quid on some things, but it's got to be in the 
context of good business sense for the organisation… we've still got to balance 
the books.” February 2007 
“This all must fit with the business plan – with no business plan, there’s no 
Peabody and no homes to worry about.” July 2007 
The stock interventions explored in XXXX et al. (forthcoming) were seen as both 
expensive and unaffordable under current conditions if applied on a large scale to 
Peabody stock. 
“There’s no point externally cladding or putting in double glazing. We can’t 
afford it and that’s that.” June 2007 
“Obviously they're shockingly expensive. The pipework you need, the primary 
pipework is a grand a metre or something, so...” February 2009 
 “Call [our current spending] £30m a year... so if we've got 15 years to do this 
stuff and it costs £160m, I'm going to say it's £10m a year, so we're adding a third 
more... it's just not feasible at all, in any way.” February 2009 
As a result, the current lack of financial viability was seen as the main barrier to 
substantial stock refurbishment at Peabody.  
Author:  “What are the big things, the main issues?” 



































































Interviewee 2:  “Money.” 
Interviewee 3:  “Money.” February 2009 
Despite the many other barriers reported here, Peabody staff felt that if the barrier of 
financial viability could be overcome through reduced costs, increased grant support or 
alternative funding mechanisms, the recommended interventions could be carried out. 
Capital and risk 
High capital costs of refurbishment options were reported as a barrier to action on many 
occasions. This led to considerable discussion focussed on how capital costs for 
interventions such as CHP could be met, with an Energy Services Company (ESCo) 
arrangement being the main option explored. Securing capital in itself was however not 
problematic for Peabody, as it was made clear by finance department staff that Peabody 
could borrow against the value of its stock and raise considerable funds immediately. The 
challenge of securing capital funding instead acted as a barrier to action because of the 
lack of a strong financial case for the considered interventions that counter-acted the risk 
of making a large investment.  
“Capital funding is no problem… it’s just paying for it.” February 2009 
“I think it's the financial model that would do it… and having an acceptable risk 
profile.” February 2009 
Throughout the study, Peabody was reported as being highly risk-averse, a position due in 
part to the recent experience of a substantial cost over-run on the BedZED development. 
This led to funding approaches being sought “where the risk is not ours, where the risk to 
us is minimised” (February 2009). Partnership-working with organisations such as 
ESCos was put forward as a means for minimising risk. 
 “I think whatever you do with renewables is always going to be a partnership. I 



































































One key informant made the case that working with external businesses would be likely 
to reduce the financial benefits of interventions for residents, due to the greater return that 
they would expect on investments. As a result, it was argued that taking on some risk was 
necessary to ensure that residents could get a better deal in terms of fuel bills savings. 
“Fuel savings are generally greater for residents where more financial risk is 
taken by the landlord or longer-term investment models are used.” March 2009 
Funding approaches 
Where the possibility of action to achieve deep emission cuts being mandated was 
discussed, Peabody staff felt that in the current context, they would have no option but to 
sell properties or increase rents to fund the work. 
“We'll be in the same position that we've been in for decent homes standards, 
actually having to raise money suddenly, through sadly sales of properties to raise 
money for it.” February 2007 
 “I don’t think we want to consider that… but the stark consequences if we had to 
do it would be rent increases or lots of sales.” February 2009 
Peabody staff recognised that rent increases were not possible in the current context, and 
whilst cautious about advocating a change that could be unpopular and detrimental to 
residents, saw a potential need to make the argument to policymakers that they should be 
permitted. 
“Then there’s an argument you’d need to make as a social landlord about the 
ability to raise rents, or receive a grant to cover this.” July 2007 
The issue of split financial incentives was raised by Peabody staff, with the most common 
solution proposed being to share the benefits of investment with residents. 
“One of the major difficulties for social landlords is that financial investment 



































































resulting from investment accrue to the resident, not the landlord, so there is little 
scope for high cost initiatives.” June 2007 
Due to these problems, other funding mechanisms were being discussed by Peabody staff 
towards the end of the research period which would be likely to require Government 
action. These included increased grant funding (Howlett 2009) and delivering 
improvements through an ESCo or utility companies, with a charge tied to each dwelling 




Action on climate change was found to be a low priority amongst Peabody residents. 
Evidence for this came from interviews with tenants conducted as part of the 21
st
 Century 
Peabody project research, low engagement with discussions on climate change at the 
residents’ conference, relatively low take-up of the offer of energy feedback monitors and 
the views of Peabody staff. 
“The environment is not a priority amongst residents at present.” May 2008 
“When you talk to residents at BedZED who aren’t the posh ones, then the 
bottom line is saving money.” February 2009 
The lack of climate change as a motivation was emphasised by a Peabody resident in 
response to a presentation by the author in 2008: 
“The only way you’re going to save energy is if people can’t afford it.” May 2008 
Recent research by Peabody staff has identified security, digital TV and soundproofing as 
the main priorities of residents for home improvements. Improvements related to energy 



































































Acceptability of interventions 
With resident satisfaction being an important goal for Peabody, the acceptability of 
interventions to residents was reported as a vitally important consideration. The key issue 
raised was that residents would need to see some significant benefits if the disruption or 
changed arrangements resulting from refurbishment were to be acceptable. 
Author:  “So, in terms of the benefits, if you offered [communal heating] to them 
and it was just going to cost the same as their previous boilers, you think that 
wouldn't be enough?” 
Interviewee 1:  “No! They would be... why are we doing this? Why are we going 
through all this disruption? Are you mad?” 
Interviewee 2:  “Because the only way you could sell it then is carbon, but people 
aren't interested, it's way down the pecking order.” 
February 2009 
For interventions to be acceptable, Peabody staff suggested that they should result in 
significant reductions in running costs, or be one part of a package of improvements that 
includes actions that satisfy residents’ priorities. 
“If you could say to them that your fuel costs are going to be 20% less, and the 
old lady who lives next door is going to be able to heat her house more for less 
money, then there might be a feeling of community spirit, but unless that's 
there…” February 2009 
“It'd have to be for a whole package of things, if it was just for that [a new 
communal heating system], then it wouldn't really make... they wouldn't buy 
that.” February 2009 
The relative disinterest in achieving emission reductions relative to minimising fuel prices 



































































Peabody’s Coopers Road estate, bringing a likely reduction in the system’s overall 
efficiency. Interventions that lead to an increase in fuel costs, as could be the case with a 
switch to electric heating systems from gas, were absolutely ruled out. 
“Well, then that would be a no-no. You can't say to people we're going to come 
and do all this work, and by the way the bills are going to be higher.” February 
2009 
When residents were asked whether increasing rents to help fund improvements could be 
acceptable (as part of Peabody’s research for the 21
st
 Century Peabody project) the idea 
was strongly rejected. This was explained in the research as being related to the idea of a 
“compact” between Peabody and its residents, and a perception that it is not delivering 
services of a sufficient quality to justify rent increases. When the idea of increasing rents 
to fund refurbishment was discussed in a presentation by the author to the Residents and 
Communities Committee, a resident in the meeting responded very negatively, stating 
that “residents would be terrified” (May 2008). It therefore appears likely that a strategy 
of rent increases would cause considerable resistance, even if residents are left better off 
overall. 
 
Residents were reported as being reluctant to remove gas fires from homes, despite 
advice by Peabody that they were inefficient, due to the role they play as a focal point and 
a belief amongst many residents that they are cheaper to run. Resident perceptions of 
communal heating were also seen as a significant barrier by Peabody staff, both because 
of its poor track record in the past and the potential for breakdowns affecting whole 
estates to damage Peabody’s reputation with residents. 
“If one heating systems breaks you have one resident to deal with, if a district 





































































For the concerns outlined above to no longer apply, Peabody staff felt that a substantially 
different social context would be necessary, with refurbishment at Peabody being 
understood as part of a national effort to refurbish UK housing. 
Interviewee 1: “I think it helps if the Government says, right everybody, a bit of 
the Dunkirk spirit...” 
Interviewee 2: “That's kind of the way almost that the Government has started 
talking about it though, at least Ed Miliband is talking about it as a "great national 
refurbishment programme", and I guess you're right, if people sort of feel that 




Leaseholder dwellings on Peabody estates are those for which the householders own the 
lease on a home (typically a flat), while Peabody still retains ownership of the building as 
a whole. As a result, leaseholders are responsible for any internal changes to such homes, 
whilst Peabody is typically responsible for external parts of the building and the provision 
of communal services. Due to the sales of homes on some Peabody estates, particularly 
those formerly managed by local authorities where tenants have a “right to buy” their 
home, leaseholder dwellings on Peabody estates are becoming increasingly common. 
 
A number of particular issues relating to leaseholder dwellings were identified during the 
research by Peabody staff, each relating to difficulties that leaseholders could create for 
efforts to carry out interventions on whole estates. These issues included: an inability to 
make internal changes to leaseholder homes; a risk that leaseholders will not want 
communal systems; and a risk that leaseholders may not be willing to sell their homes if a 



































































wall insulation took place on estates with leaseholders during the research period, it was 
not possible to study the impacts that these issues had in practice. 
Resources, internal processes, and staff views 
Skills, internal capacity and partnerships 
With regard to their existing skills and capacity to work with carbon reduction 
technologies, Peabody staff reported a generally poor performance to date with 
communal heating and providing a utility service to residents.  
“Peabody doesn’t understand the management of utilities… to avoid all 
management issues, they sell all of the electricity generated to the grid and let 
Solar Century do all of the management.” June 2006 
 “We've got a very poor record in managing district heating systems, whether it’s 
understanding how to bill and meter, or understanding how to manage the piece 
of kit itself.” February 2009 
The central issue raised when this was discussed was on the extent to which this was 
addressed by developing new internal capacity, forming partnerships or developing an 
ESCo. 
“We have to work out if we have an in-house team, or gas contractors or 
whatever it is that understands them, or if possible, we farm it out to a third party, 
but for the third party, it may not be worth their while.” February 2009 
Issues of capacity were also discussed early on in the research period in terms of a lack of 
time to carry out work on energy efficiency issues. These concerns led to the creation of 
the Energy Efficiency Coordinator post. 
 
In the light of the identified need for external expertise and the sharing of risk, 
partnership-working with the likes of ESCos or utilities was seen as a crucial complement 



































































“The time always comes where you have to say Peabody in partnership with - 
because we're about providing housing.” February 2009 
“It is a challenge that can only be met by powerful partnership working from 
social landlords, the government, utilities firms and residents themselves.” 
(Howlett 2009) 
 
The formation of an ESCo to assist with the management and strategy development of 
energy provision was recommended strongly to Peabody by its energy consultants, so this 
issue was explored in 2006 and 2007 through meetings with potential ESCo partners. A 
key barrier identified was the lack of interest from potential external partners, due to the 
apparent lack of a strong financial case for installing CHP on Peabody estates. 
“Sorry, but we have had the London ESCo here saying they’re not interested.” 
July 2007 
“Where are they? There’s no one beating down on our door saying there’s cash to 
be made by putting in 30 CHPs.” July 2007 
As was the case with financial decisions, discussions around external partnerships were 
strongly influenced by a concern to minimise risk. This was commonly framed in terms 
of whether an organisation was a “robust partner” (February 2007). This concern was 
motivated in part by the experience of the organisation supplying the biomass CHP unit at 
BedZED going out of business. There was also caution about the idea of creating a 
Peabody ESCo, due to the risk that if it delivered a poor service to residents it could 
damage Peabody’s reputation.  
Internal processes and prioritisation of goals 
A number of common themes from the literature on sustainability in organisations 
greening were observed at Peabody. These included the positive impact of strong support 



































































support for proposals from senior staff. It was recognised on many occasions that 
responsibility for many issues relating to energy use in Peabody stock was dispersed 
throughout the organisation. Effective action was hindered in part at Peabody by a “silo 
culture” (a term coined in 2006 by an internal working group at Peabody, referring to a 
lack of effective communication between departments). This was observed for action on a 
number of relevant issues in 2006. With regard to energy efficiency, the “silo” issue 
appeared to be effectively addressed by the formation of the Green Task Force, which 
brought together staff from many parts of the organisation, and by concentrating 
responsibility for work on energy issues in the post of the Energy Efficiency Coordinator. 
The need to mainstream work on sustainability was stressed on many occasions, and 
action was taken to achieve this by increasingly incorporating work on sustainability in 
the personal performance targets of staff during the research period.  
 
A number of other organisational goals that could potentially conflict with a carbon 
reduction agenda were identified during the research period. These were typically derived 
from regulation, and included installing digital TV infrastructure, meeting new fire safety 
regulations and achieving budget savings through efficiency improvements. The conflict 
between minimising the times that homes are empty between tenancies and carrying out 
comprehensive refurbishment in dwellings was highlighted as a potential barrier to 
action. Conflicts between goals raise the question of how they are prioritised. It was 
recognised by Peabody staff early in the research period that carbon reduction was not 
prioritised at that time. Although in 2009 it has a much higher status, it was recognised 
that without a requirement to act, it would inevitably be a lower priority than goals that 
Peabody was forced to act upon. 
“These things have not been prioritised.” June 2007 
“Inevitably, something that we don't have to do is slipping down the agenda a 




































































Staff attitudes to interventions 
Peabody staff demonstrated a number of attitudinal responses to carbon reduction 
interventions, including support of their potential to reduce emissions and reduce fuel 
bills, and negative perceptions that could act as a barrier to action in some cases. These 
attitudes included a perceived risk associated with installing new technologies, and 
scepticism about the claims made for the benefits of emerging technologies, based upon 
prior experience of technologies failing to meet expectations. 
“They want to do a scheme with no heating, with no obvious heating, and I got a 
bit nervous”. February 2007 
“A few years ago it was all microCHP, now that's not a good idea.” June 2008 
The perceptions that interventions using new or emerging technologies would be complex 
and involve “hassle” were common amongst Peabody staff. 
 “If you connect your building to a normal network, like EDF or something, you 
know what's going on, but if you connect to something with a specialist service 
agreement, then there's all sorts of new headaches.” February 2007 
 “In terms of insulation though, it's fiddly, diddly, diddly. My god, just think 
about every window…” February 2009 
The dominant view amongst Peabody staff early on in the research was that little could be 
done to improve fabric on estates, a view which shifted towards the end of the research 
period, with many staff feeling that it was worth investigating. This interest, arising 
through recommendations from this research project and uncertainty around costs, created 
an impetus to carry out a pilot refurbishment to explore these issues for a typical 
Victorian-era Peabody estate.  
“Would the money be there? We need to do a 19
th
 century block and see how it 





































































The key issues identified and some of their wider implications are discussed below, with 
regard to the motivations for carrying out interventions (drivers for action), and other 
contextual factors which affect their viability and acceptability (potential barriers). Some 
recommendations for policymakers arising from these results are then presented. 
Motivations 
Peabody was identified as putting great importance on compliance with regulation, as is 
typical for an organisation operating in a highly-regulated sector. A key issue identified 
was that strong external drivers for the achievement of deep emission cuts do not exist at 
present. Despite a commitment identified for Peabody to take a lead within the sector on 
this issue and strong motivations of individual staff members, Peabody staff felt that 
externally mandated goals will inevitably take priority. These factors indicate that it 
would be beneficial for Government to mandate action by Peabody (and by extension 
other social landlords) to improve their stock, so that this issue is given sufficient priority 
relative to other externally-mandated goals. This would require a change in policy from 
the UK Government, which to date has rejected calls for setting minimum energy 
efficiency standards for existing housing (Green Futures 2008).  
 
A further key motivation identified, that could indicate a financial case for stock 
refurbishment, was the potential risk that homes may become impossible to let if future 
fuel price increases lead to residents having prohibitively high fuel bills. This was seen as 
a potentially serious issue both by Peabody staff and other social housing staff 
interviewed as part of the wider research project (XXXX 2009a). This concern could 
provide motivation in future years to insulate homes to reduce space heating needs and to 




































































During the research period, a significant increase in the prioritisation of work to reduce 
carbon emissions from Peabody stock was observed, with Peabody appearing to be 
relatively advanced in this work relative to other social landlords. Despite this change, its 
staff felt that substantial action is not possible in the current context due to the increased 
expenditure required. To bridge this funding gap, four possible sources of funds appear to 
be available for social landlords: their tenants (through increased rents or other charges); 
the general public (through increased Government grants or charges administered by 
utility companies); the sale of social housing stock; reduced spending on other services 
and operations.
3
 The risk of negative social impacts of these approaches, coupled with the 
likely resistance to increased charges identified in the present study, points towards a 
need for external funding to play a substantial role, as has been suggested elsewhere (e.g. 
EHA 2009). Current trends indicate an increased willingness on the part of the UK 
Government to make increased financial support available, as demonstrated by its pledge 
to support domestic micro-generation measures through feed-in tariffs and a renewable 
heat incentive (funded in both cases through utility bills), and plans to trial grant-funded 
area-based refurbishment through its Community Energy Saving Programme (DECC 
2009). However, these levels of financial support are still likely to be insufficient to 
enable refurbishment to achieve deep emission cuts to be funded for Peabody stock 
(XXXX et al. 2009). 
 
A lack of internal capacity for managing new technologies was also shown to be a 
significant issue. Such issues were anticipated, given the early stage of the diffusion of 
low-carbon refurbishment in the UK, and therefore may be addressed over future years if 
this process is taken up more widely. The new skills required for actions such as billing 



































































external organisations to deliver carbon reduction interventions. These concerns and 
possible solutions have been explored extensively in literature on refurbishment of social 
housing (e.g. EST 2007), and create a need for adequate support to be made available to 
social landlords when it is needed.  
Acceptability 
The acceptability of interventions for Peabody’s residents was identified as a key 
requirement by Peabody staff and as a result, a lack of acceptability could pose a 
significant barrier to action. This issue appears to be of some importance, as reducing 
carbon emissions was identified as a low priority amongst Peabody tenants. The potential 
disruption and inconvenience resulting from refurbishment was seen as a barrier which 
would require residents to perceive tangible benefits, in particular in terms of reduced 
fuel bills, if it was to be overcome.  
 
Peabody staff felt that if action could be framed in terms of a UK-wide effort to reduce 
emissions from housing, then residents would be more likely to be supportive. The lack 
of such a clear vision has been cited as a key barrier for the achievement of this goal over 
recent years (UKGBC 2008). Policy on existing housing refurbishment is however 
increasingly moving in that direction, with Government recently speaking of a “Great 
British Refurb” in its Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2009). This plan has indicated 
a significant increase in ambition on existing housing refurbishment, and includes 
proposals that by 2030, all UK homes receive whole-house energy efficiency measures, 
including renewable technologies where appropriate (ibid). However, the requirement 
that these measures are “cost effective” may exclude a number of technologies that 
appear necessary to achieve deep emission cuts, but which may not achieve a payback 
within their lifetime (XXXX et al. (2009). 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 The impacts of funding refurbishment of Peabody stock through stock sales or rent 




































































The increased prominence of climate change and fuel poverty led to broad support for the 
principle of intervening to reduce stock carbon reduction interventions, which drew both 
upon support from individual staff members and reference to Peabody’s goals as an 
organisation. This situation echoes the findings of Bansal (2003) which identified a fit 
between staff and organisational values as key requirements to support work by 
organisations on sustainability (Bansal 2003). With regard to particular interventions, 
negative perceptions based upon the poor past experiences of both staff and residents 
were seen as hindering the installation of communal heating. Staff were also concerned 
that communal heating could be negatively perceived by residents as providing less 
control than individual boilers, despite the fact that this needn’t be the case. Overcoming 
this barrier is likely to require both residents and staff gaining positive experiences of 
communal heating through a diffusion of the technology over future years. 
 
Recommendations for policymakers 
Based upon the discussion above, four main recommendations for policymakers arising 
from this research are put forward: 
§ Provide a framework on housing refurbishment for landlords and the public 
§ Regulate to enforce action by social landlords 
§ Create funding models and offer financial incentives to make interventions 
financially viable 
§ Change existing regulations for social housing that conflict with the carbon 
reduction agenda 
 
A framework should provide the public with an understanding that refurbishment is part 
of a nationwide effort to reduce the emissions from existing housing. The emerging 



































































positively communicating the scale of the work required. By setting out a vision for the 
action required to achieve deep emission cuts, the external context seen as vital by 
Peabody staff to make disruption to residents acceptable could be achieved. Social 
landlords also need a long-term policy framework to assist with their future business 
planning. Such a framework is likely to come about through regulation on the 
improvements or increased energy efficiency standards required, and a number of 
proposals already exist for achieving this (Boardman 2007; EST 2008; Housing Forum 
2009; NEA 2009). Regardless of the approach taken, the findings from this research 
imply that mandating action for social landlords is likely to be necessary to provide 
sufficient motivation for social landlords to act. This requires a shift from the current 
approach put forward by Government of promoting action on a voluntary basis (Green 
Futures 2008). 
 
A necessary complement to regulation is to ensure that refurbishment is financially 
viable. This is a complex task, as in addition to grant funding and other financial 
mechanisms, it requires a number of structural barriers affecting financial viability to be 
addressed. One key barrier is the inability of social landlords to share in the financial 
benefits of refurbishment by increasing charges to residents to offset some of their own 
expenditure. Giving social landlords greater freedom to change rent levels could be a 
useful step to make refurbishment more financially viable. As increasing rents to fund 
refurbishment may not be politically feasible, the Government should more generally 
ensure that viable financial mechanisms are available to social landlords, which minimise 
the risk, upfront costs and total lifetime costs of carrying out whole-house carbon 
reduction interventions. A variety of mechanisms for achieving this exist (reviewed in 
EHA 2009), such as providing low cost loans and linking repayments to a dwelling rather 
than a household (for example through council tax payments). Grant funding is also likely 
to be required for social landlords. External funding covering at least 50% of costs has 



































































2007; EHA 2009; XXXX et al. 2009). Support on this scale should be pursued, as the 
only available alternatives are likely to be rent increases or stock sales. 
 
Finally, Government should look to change regulations that conflict with a social 
landlord’s carbon reduction agenda. An example of this would be altering the regulations 
that require the time that dwellings are unoccupied between tenancies to be minimised, so 
that comprehensive whole-house refurbishments can be carried out (Housing Forum 
2009). A second example would be to ensuring that grant funding is standardly available 
to cover refurbishment costs for leaseholder dwellings when a whole estate is refurbished. 
This approach has been successfully used in the past to ensure that all households on a 
council housing estate in Aberdeen could be connected to a new district heating system 
(King 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
Through participant observation with Peabody, a number of significant contextual issues 
affecting the viability of carrying out carbon reduction interventions have been identified. 
The results indicate that in the current context, interventions to achieve deep carbon 
emission cuts are not financially viable for Peabody, and may not be seen as acceptable 
by Peabody residents. These findings are likely to apply equally to other UK social 
landlords (which each face similar operating conditions), indicating a great challenge in 
achieving deep carbon emission cuts in the social housing sector.  
 
These findings point to a need for the UK Government to intervene in a number of ways 
to change these contextual issues. This should include mandating that action takes place, 
ensuring that the necessary improvements are financially viable and giving an indication 



































































existing housing. Without actions of this nature, it appears unlikely that action to achieve 
deep carbon emission cuts from existing social housing will be viable. 
 
With regard to future research that builds upon the findings of this study, research on 
actual carbon reduction refurbishments of housing estates would be of great value. 
Longitudinal research exploring the organisational process of delivering the measures and 
the views of those involved could be particularly beneficial. Such research could be used 
to improve knowledge of issues such as costs, funding mechanisms, acceptability to 
stakeholders, political or organisational barriers and the actual impacts of refurbishment 




CHP: Combined Heat and Power 
ESCo: Energy Services Company 
GLA: Greater London Authority 
KPI: Key Performance Indicator 
RSL: Registered Social Landlord 
SAP: Standard Assessment Procedure (for energy ratings of UK homes) 
SHIFT: Sustainable Homes Index For Tomorrow 
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